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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
: Case No. 2000013 5-CA 
vs. 
VALERIE D. THOMPSON, Priority No. 2 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
Defendant appeals from a conviction for violation of the compulsory 
education laws in the Seventh Judicial Juvenile Court, Emery County, the Honorable 
Scott N. Johansen presiding. Defendant's conviction was based on her failure to 
respond to a written request for parental support in securing regular school 
attendance by a minor, a class B misdemeanor, in violation of UTAH CODE ANN. 
§ 53A-11-101(3) (2000). 
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) 
(1996). 
ISSUES ON APPEAL AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1. Joint proceedings. Is defendant, who agreed to the juvenile court's joint 
proceedings, entitled to appellate review of her joinder claim? 
A claim not raised below can only be reviewed for plain error. See State v. 
Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1208 (Utah 1993). However, review for plain error does not 
lie when a party has consciously refrained from objecting, thereby inviting error. 
State v. Bullock, 791 P.2d 155, 159 (Utah 1989). 
2. Joint representation. Did the juvenile court commit plain error by not 
inquiring into a potential conflict of interest from defense counsel's representation 
of both defendant and her daughter when no conflict of interest was apparent? 
To prevail on the unpreserved claim of court error, defendant must meet the 
plain error standard. See Dunn, 850 P.2d at 1208. 
3. Ineffective assistance of counsel-trial performance. Did defendant 
demonstrate that trial counsel performed deficiently in his conduct at trial and, if so, 
did his deficiency result in prejudice? 
An ineffective assistance claim raises questions of law. See State v. 
Maestas, 1999 UT 32, f20, 984 P.2d 376, 379; State v. Chacon, 962 P.2d 48, 50 
(Utah 1998). To establish ineffective assistance of counsel, defendant must show 
that her counsel "rendered deficient performance which fell below an objective 
standard of reasonable professional judgment and that counsel's deficient 
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performance prejudiced [her]." Maestas, 1999 UT 32, f20 (internal quotation marks 
and citation omitted). She must "identify specific acts or omissions that fell outside 
the wide range of professional assistance and illustrate that, absent those acts or 
omissions, there is a reasonable probability of a more favorable result." Id. (internal 
quotation marks and citation omitted). Because defendant made no objection at 
trial, she must show an actual, not possible, conflict. See Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 
U.S. 335, 347-48 (1980). Further, in reviewing trial counsel's performance, the 
court must "indulge in the strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the 
wide range of reasonable professional assistance." State v. Templin, 805 P.2d 182, 
186 (Utah 1990) (quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 689 (1984)). 
4. Sufficiency of the evidence. Should the court review defendant's 
challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence when she has not marshaled the 
evidence? 
"When reviewing a bench trial for sufficiency of evidence, we must sustain 
the trial court's judgment unless it is against the clear weight of the evidence, or if 
the appellate court otherwise reaches a definite and firm conviction that a mistake 
has been made." State v. Reed, 839 P.2d 878, 879 (1992). "Because the trial court 
ha[s] the opportunity to view the[] witnesses and weigh their credibility, we defer to 
its findings unless the record demonstrates clear error." Id. at 880. To prevail on a 
claim of insufficient evidence, a defendant must first marshal all the evidence that 
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supports the trial court's findings and then show how this marshaled evidence, when 
viewed in a light most favorable to the trial court's ruling, is insufficient to support 
the trial court's findings." State v. Gamblin, 2000 UT 44, f 17 n.2, 1 P.3d 1108. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
The following relevant constitutional provisions, rules, and statutes are 
reproduced in Addendum A: 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 53A-11-101 (2000) 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 53A-11-103 (2000) 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-8a(l) (1999) 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-3a-l 15(2) (Supp. 2000) 
Utah R. Crim. P. 12 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND RELEVANT FACTS 
Defendant was charged with a compulsory education violation, a class B 
misdemeanor, in violation of UTAH CODE ANN. § 53 A-11-101(3) (2000), for 
refusing to respond to written requests by the local school district for assistance in 
securing her daughter's regular attendance at school. R. 1. Defendant's daughter 
Elise had missed more than 150 days of school over the preceding two years, largely 
without parental notification or excuse to the school. See R. 26: 6-7, 13; State 
Exhibits 1-3. Defendant retained counsel and appeared for trial on January 20, 
2000. R. 26:1. 
The court scheduled trials for defendant and her daughter for the same day. 
R. 26:3-5. Defense counsel, who represented both defendant and her daughter, 
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arrived for trial confused about the status of Elise's truancy charges. Elise had been 
charged with truancy for both the 1998-1999 and the 1999-2000 school years. 
Defense counsel apparently believed that the 1998-1999 school year truancy count 
had already been adjudicated. R. 26:2-3. In fact, the court had ruled only that Elise 
had failed to comply with the terms of a diversion agreement addressing her 
truancies; it had not ruled on the 1998-1999 truancy charge itself. R. 26:2-4. The 
second truancy charge for absences during November and December, 1999, had 
been sent to the district attorney for screening. 
Consequently, the court had before it Elise's 1998-99 school year truancy 
charge and defendant's November-December 1999 compulsory education violation. 
Despite his confusion about Elise's status, defense counsel never expressed any 
confusion regarding the charge against defendant. 
The juvenile court explained that the court would be trying Elise's truancy as 
well as the charges against defendant. R. 26:2. The court then asked defense 
counsel whether he had any objection to taking all of the testimony at once and then 
separating the two cases at argument. Defendant agreed that the suggested 
procedure was "okay." Id. Testimony on both matters was taken at once, and any 
necessary differentiation between the matters was made in closing argument. 
R. 26:6. 
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Defendant testified at trial that her daughter is a "brittle diabetic" who suffers 
sudden, life-threatening episodes of diabetic ketoacidosis caused by abnormally high 
blood sugars. R. 26:41. She ascribed most of Elise's absences to her illness. 
R. 26:61-63. Defendant claimed that she called in excuses for many of Elise's 
illnesses, but could not say whether she called in more often than the school records 
showed. R. 26:63-64. Defendant claimed that she tried to contact Merlin Weber, 
the school principal, by phone numerous times over the year, without success. 
R. 26:57-58. 
The State introduced exhibits showing that Elise had missed approximately 
ninety of the first 134 days of the 1998-1999 school year. See State's Exhibit 1. 
School records indicated that approximately seventy of the absences were 
unexcused. Id. During the ninety-day fall semester beginning in August 1999, Elise 
had missed sixty-four full days and parts of eight other days. See State's Exhibits 2 
& 3. Over forty of the days were unexcused. Id. 
Principal Weber testified that he had complied with district policies in sending 
certified letters to defendant following Elise's lack of attendance in the 1998-99 
school year. R. 26:6-8, 10. The letters sought a conference with defendant to 
discuss the situation. R. 26:8. Defendant met with the principal on November 19, 
1998, and a plan was arranged that made allowances for Elise's health problems, 
including allowing her to complete assignments at home. R. 26:9-10, 30-31. 
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Continued unexcused absences after this meeting prompted involvement of a 
mediation counsel.1 R. 26:10. However, despite written notice, neither defendant 
nor her daughter appeared for the appointment before the counsel, prompting a 
referral to the juvenile court. R. 26:10. A home study program was eventually 
arranged for the remainder of the year. R. 26:22-26. However, either defendant or 
Elise canceled eight of the eighteen scheduled study meetings. R. 26:35-36. 
In the 1999-2000 school year, the problem continued. R. 26:11-13. 
Defendant did not arrange for a home study program pursuant to district policy, and 
she did not call in daily to excuse Elise's absences. R. 26:13, 20, 26-27, 37. 
School attendance records show that Elise had missed more than sixty-four of the 
first ninety days of the 1999-2000 school year and that forty-one of her full-day 
absences were unexcused. State's Exhibits 2 & 3. 
Principal Weber testified that he sent defendant a letter asking her to "please 
come in and let[']s talk about how to solve the problem" as well as three "excessive 
absences citation[s]." R. 26:13-14. All correspondence went by certified mail. See 
State's Exhibit 4, attached in Addendum B. 
lWhen attendance problems cannot be resolved at the school or district level, 
Emery County School District refers truant students and their parents to a mediation 
council that includes representatives from the Division of Child and Family Services, the 
school district, the local interagency council, and the juvenile court. Notice of the 
meeting cautions that students will be referred to juvenile court for truancy if they do not 
attend their scheduled mediation meeting. See Defendant's Exhibit 9, attached in 
Addendum B. 
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In the first letter dated November 15, 1999, but apparently mailed and 
received together with the first excessive absence citation, the principal expressed 
his concerns about Elise's lack of attendance and unexcused absences. See State's 
Exhibits 4, 6, attached in Addendum B. He stated that the school had been able to 
accommodate other students with serious diabetic problems and asked defendant to 
"[p]lease come in and let[']s talk about how to solve the problem." State's 
Exhibit 6. 
The first excessive absence citation, dated November 19, stated: 
This citation is to notify the parent/guardian that the above student 
has three (3) unexcused absences. State law requires the 
parent/guardian to assist the school in securing regular attendance of 
their child and failure to do so can result in a class B misdemeanor 
charge being filed against the parent/guardian. 
District policy requires that one or both parents/guardians attend a 
meeting with the school principal/assistant principal to discuss their 
student[']s attendance problem before the student is allowed to return to 
school. Please contact the school as soon as possible to schedule a date 
and time. 
State's Exhibit 5, attached in Addendum B. In the citation's comment section, 
Principal Weber had written, "Elise really has 14 unexcused absences because no 
one has called to excuse her for some time." Id. 
On November 24, Mr. Weber sent defendant a letter discussing homework 
assignments and unexcused absences. State's Exhibit 7, attached in Addendum B. 
Atttached was a second excessive absence citation again notifying defendant of the 
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state law requiring parents to assist the school in securing regular attendance of their 
children and again warning that failure to do so can result in a class B 
misdemeanor. See id. 
On December 1, Mr. Weber sent another letter discussing his willingness to 
help accommodate Elise and attaching a third excessive absence citation. This 
citation notified defendant that Elise was being referred to juvenile court. 
When asked to comment on the result of his correspondence, Mr. Weber 
testified that he knew of only two phone calls defendant made to the school. He 
testified that he returned these calls and spoke to defendant's son, identifying 
himself and stating that defendant was trying to reach him. He "spelled out a little 
note" when he returned the second call. R. 26:20. To his knowledge, defendant 
made no other attempts to contact him. R. 26:19. Elise's unexcused absences did 
not improve. R. 26:13-14, 20. 
Defendant testified that she tried to contact the principal by phone numerous 
times without success. R. 26:57-58, 61. She testified to numerous trips to the 
hospital occasioned by Elise's illness, but agreed with medical records showing in-
patient stays at Castle View Hospital totaling only approximately four days during 
the fall 1998 semester. R. 26:61, 67-68. She testified to an additional five-day non-
emergency stay at Cottonwood Hospital in the early fall, but offered no additional 
hospital records for that year. She offered no hospital records for 1999. She 
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obtained letters from at least three doctors regarding Elise's illness. R. 26:52. Two 
of them believed that Elise was able to attend school during 1998, and one of the 
two thought Elise had a phobia or exhibited school avoidance behavior by using her 
diabetes as a means of regularly missing school. R. 26:69, 70. Defendant had no 
medical letters relating to 1999. She admitted that she did not call the school to 
excuse absences daily, but stated that she called periodically to say things had not 
changed, that Elise was ill, or that Elise was back in the hospital. R. 26:51-52, 64. 
She testified that she had urged the school to gather homework assignments for 
Elise, but that some teachers refused. R. 26:58-59. However, she admitted that 
during 1999 she picked up homework for Elise only two or three times. R. 26:70. 
The trial judge found defendant to be less than credible and found her guilty 
of the compulsory education violation. R. 14-15; 26:82-83, 92-93. He sentenced 
defendant to six months in the Emery County Detention Center and imposed a $500 
fine. He suspended all but two days of the term and placed defendant on probation 
for one year. R. 14-15. 
Defendant timely appealed. R. 19. Defendant subsequently filed a motion for 
remand under rule 23B, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, to determine whether 
her counsel was ineffective. This court denied the motion. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
1. Joint proceedings. Because defendant agreed to the juvenile court's 
hearing testimony concurrently on the truancy matter and the compulsory education 
violation, she cannot obtain appellate review on this issue. Further, any error was 
harmless. 
2. Joint representation. Because defendant did not raise the issue, the 
juvenile court did not have an affirmative duty to investigate potential conflicts of 
interest. Any error was neither obvious nor harmful. Defendant's claim that her 
counsel was ineffective for representing both mother and daughter requires a 
demonstration of actual conflict. Defendant has identified no actual conflict and has 
demonstrated no prejudice. 
3. Ineffective assistance of counsel-trial performance. Despite trial 
counsel's initial confusion regarding the daughter's truancies, his performance was 
not deficient. Defendant has not identified any specific acts or omissions that fall 
outside the wide range of professional assistance and has not illustrated prejudice. 
4. Sufficiency of the evidence. Defendant has not met her burden to 
properly marshal the evidence relevant to this claim. In any event, the clear weight 
of the evidence supported the juvenile court's determination that every element of 
the offense, including refusal to respond to a written request that included the 
statutorily mandated notice, had been proven beyond a reasonable doubt. 
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Defendant's alternative argument-that she did indeed comply with the school's 
requests-also fails. The juvenile court disbelieved defendant's testimony about her 
attempts to contact the school. The credibility determination is not clearly 




If the juvenile court erred by holding joint proceedings, defendant invited 
that error. In any event, defendant has demonstrated no harm. 
Defendant claims that the juvenile court plainly erred when it took evidence 
on defendant's compulsory education violation at the same time it took evidence on 
her daughter's 1998-99 truancies. Defendant invited any error by affirmatively 
agreeing to the proposed procedure. In any event, defendant has failed to 
demonstrate harm. 
A. No error occurred. 
To support her argument, defendant relies on UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-8a-
l(3)(a) (1999), which governs joinder of cases in criminal proceedings. Defendant's 
reliance on this section is misplaced. First, defendant's case and her daughter's case 
were never joined. The juvenile court merely received testimony on both matters at 
the same time, but kept the cases separate for argument and for disposition. Second, 
section 77-8a-l(3)(a) applies only to cases charged by information. Elise's case was 
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not charged by information. Her truancy petition was not a criminal matter and 
therefore was not governed by the criminal procedure code. 
Arguably, the more applicable section is UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-3a-l 15(2) 
(Supp. 2000), a provision of the juvenile court code, which states that "[m]inor's 
cases shall be heard separately from adult cases." Defendant did not argue this 
provision below nor has she on appeal. This court ordinarily does not consider 
issues sua sponte that have not been raised on appeal. State v. Rodriguez, 841 P.2d 
1228 (Ut. App. 1992). Therefore, defendant cannot rely on this provision.2 
B. Defendant invited any error. 
Even if hearing the testimony together were error, defendant invited that error 
by agreeing to the procedure. It is well established that absent plain error, an 
appellant may not claim error on appeal when she did not timely object below. 
State v. Brown, 948 P.2d 337, 343 (Utah 1997); State v. Eldredge, 713 P.2d 29, 35 
(Utah). The plain error doctrine "exists to permit review of trial court rulings as a 
way of protecting a defendant from the harm that can be caused by less-than-perfect 
counsel." Bullock, 791 P.2d at 159 (Utah 1989). Plain error review, however, does 
not lie when a party, through counsel, consciously refrains from objecting or has led 
2In any event, the juvenile court merely took evidence on the two matters together, 
but kept them separate for argument and disposition. The cases were therefore "heard 
separately" for purposes of the statute. Also, the juvenile court code's provision that 
"[mjinor's cases shall be heard separately from adult cases" is for the benefit of the 
minor, not the adult. Therefore, defendant, who is an adult, cannot complain. 
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the trial court into error. Id.; Brown, 948 P.2d at 343. Thus, "'invited error' ... is 
procedurally unjustified and viewed with disfavor, especially where ample 
opportunity has been afforded to avoid such a result.'" State v. Parsons, 781 P.2d 
1275, 1284-85 (Utah 1989) (quoting State v. Tillman, 750 P.2d 546, 560-61 (Utah 
1987)). Otherwise, a criminal defendant could "invite" prejudicial error and 
"implant it in the record as a form of appellate insurance ...." Id. 
Here, defendant did not request a severance of the two matters. Rather, when 
the juvenile court asked whether defendant had "any objections [to] taking all the 
testimony at once and ... separating] at argument," defense counsel affirmatively 
agreed to the proposed procedure. R. 26:2. If any error occurred, defendant 
consciously agreed to the error, thereby inviting it. Defendant is therefore precluded 
from obtaining appellate review on this issue. See Brown, 948 P.2d at 343. 
C. In any event, defendant has not demonstrated harm. 
In any event, defendant has not shown how she was harmed by the court's 
taking evidence on both cases at the same time. Defendant was not tried before a 
jury. Defendant's trial was scheduled back to back with her daughter's truancy 
adjudication. Because the two matters were closely connected and required 
testimony from the same witnesses, the judge elected, with defendant's consent, to 
receive testimony on both matters at the same time, then to address and rule on each 
matter in succession. Thus, if defendant had not agreed to the procedure, the court 
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could have received the testimony regarding both matters in quick succession. 
Defendant does not explain, nor can she, how that alternative procedure would have 
benefitted her. 
A judge often presides over and hears testimony in related matters involving 
multiple defendants. Still, he may serve as the trier of fact in any one or more of 
those matters. The judicial system presumes that he can ignore evidence not before 
him, even if otherwise relevant, and apply only the evidence properly admitted in 
the matter he is adjudicating. Cf. People v. Daniels, 415 N.W.2d 282, 285 (1987) 
(despite general rule that a defendant must be allowed to wear civilian clothes at 
trial, no prejudicial effect if tried before a judge rather than a jury); State v. Collins, 
495 So. 2d 331 (La. Ct. App. 1986) (same); People v. Zapata, 34 Cal. Rptr. 171 
(Cal. App. 1963) (error to require defendant be tried in jail clothing, but harmless at 
bench trial). 
That presumption applies in the instant case. Presumably, the trial judge here 
was competent to apply the evidence properly admissible in defendant's case. 
Presumably, he was also capable of sorting through the evidence and considering 
only evidence properly admissible in defendant's case. Defendant has pointed to no 
evidence admitted in this joint proceeding that could not have been admitted had 
defendant been tried in a separate trial. Nor has she pointed to any evidence that 
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the trial court impermissibly relied on in finding her guilty. Any error is therefore 
harmless. 
Point II 
Absent any objection, the juvenile court had no affirmative 
duty to investigate potential conflicts of interest. If any error 
occurred, it was neither obvious nor harmful. Because defendant 
has demonstrated no actual conflict, she cannot prevail 
on her related ineffective assistance of counsel claim. 
Defendant claims that the juvenile court plainly erred when it permitted 
defense counsel to represent both defendant and her daughter. Neither defendant 
nor defense counsel requested that the court require defendant to retain separate 
counsel for herself or for her daughter. No objection was made to defense counsel's 
representation of both parties. Defendant must therefore establish plain error: that 
(1) error occurred, (2) the error was obvious, and (3) the error was harmful. See 
Dunn, 850 P.2d at 1208. Defendant did not meet this standard. The court did not 
err. If the court did err, its error was neither obvious nor harmful. Furthermore, 
trial counsel's joint representation of mother and daughter did not constitute 
ineffective assistance of counsel. 
A. The juvenile court had no duty to initiate an inquiry into the propriety 
of defense counsel's joint representation. 
"Requiring or permitting a single attorney to represent codefendants, often 
referred to as joint representation, is not per se violative of constitutional guarantees 
of effective assistance of counsel." Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S., 475, 481 
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(1978). In fact, in some cases, joint representation may foster certain advantages. 
"A common defense often gives strength against a common attack." Holloway, 435 
U.S. at 483 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 
In the absence of an objection to multiple representation, "a reviewing court 
cannot presume that the possibility for conflict has resulted in ineffective assistance 
of counsel." Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 348 (1980). "[T]he Sixth 
Amendment [does not] require[] state courts ... to initiate inquiries into the propriety 
of multiple representation in every case." Id. at 346. "Unless the trial court knows 
or reasonably should know that a particular conflict exists, the court need not 
initiate an inquiry." Id. at 347. 
Defendant acknowledges that the issue of conflict was not raised at trial. See 
Br. Aplt. at 11. Therefore, defendant's reliance on State v. Velarde, 806 P.2d 1190 
(Utah App. 1991), is misplaced. In Velarde, defendants raised objections to a 
potential conflict of interest at trial, the trial court failed to investigate, and this 
court presumed prejudice. However, the Velarde standard, also detailed in 
Holloway, is not applicable in the absence of an objection. See Cuyler, 445 U.S. at 
345-48 (holding that "a defendant who raised no objection at trial must demonstrate 
that an actual conflict of interest adversely affected his lawyer's performance"). As 
stated in Velarde, "[T]rial courts need not investigate every possible nuance 
surrounding a potential conflict of interest, nor do they have an affirmative duty to 
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initiate an investigation into such matters when not raised ...." 806 P.2d at 1193. 
Thus, the question is whether the trial court knew or reasonably should have known 
that a conflict of interest existed. 
Here, the juvenile court had no way of knowing that a conflict existed. Both 
defendant and Elise raised Elise's illness as a common defense. Nothing in the 
record suggests any particular conflict that should have been apparent to the court. 
Even in arguing this issue on appeal, defendant has not specified what conflict 
might have existed or what other defense she would have raised if she had been 
represented by separate counsel. In view of the foregoing, the juvenile court did not 
err in not initiating an inquiry into any potential conflicts of interest. 
B. Defendant has not established that the juvenile court plainly erred when 
it permitted defense counsel's joint representation. 
Even if there were error, the error was not obvious. No precedent has 
established that a court must require separate representation for a minor in a truancy 
adjudication and a parent on trial for a compulsory education violation based on the 
minor's truancy. 
Any error was also harmless. Defendant has not alleged that counsel 
represented her less than faithfully because of his joint representation of her 
daughter. She has not detailed how counsel's joint representation prejudiced her 
common defense. Nothing suggests that the court's failure to require separate 
counsel harmed defendant. 
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C. Defense counsel's joint representation did not constitute ineffective 
assistance of counsel. 
Defendant also seeks review of this claim by alleging ineffective assistance 
of counsel. Defendant claims that trial counsel's failure to request a recess, discuss 
the nature of the proceedings with defendants, and advise them of the potential 
conflicts constituted ineffective representation. Aplt. Br. at 16. Because new 
counsel represents defendant in this appeal and because this court has previously 
denied defendant's Rule 23B motion, review may proceed on the record established 
in the juvenile court. See State v. Litherland, 2000 UT 76, ff 17-18, 405 Utah Adv. 
Rep. 14. 
"In order to establish a violation of the Sixth Amendment, a defendant who 
raised no objection at trial must demonstrate that an actual conflict of interest 
adversely affected his lawyer's performance." Cuyler, 446 U.S. at 348. "[T]he 
possibility of conflict is insufficient...." Id. at 350. 
As stated, defendant has identified no actual conflict. Defendant merely 
states that defense counsel should have advised defendant and her daughter of "the 
potential conflict." Br. Aplt. at 15. This is not a case where co-defendants might 
raise conflicting defenses, one implicating the other, or where the prosecution has 
offered one co-defendant a plea bargain in exchange for her testimony against 
another co-defendant. Nor is it a case where testimony by one defendant might 
disadvantage the other. Rather, defendant and her daughter both argued that Elise's 
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absences were the result of illness. This case was, in fact, among those where "[a] 
common defense often gives strength against a common attack." Holloway, 435 
U.S. at 483 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Defendant has 
demonstrated no actual conflict. 
Nor has defendant demonstrated that any "conflict of interest adversely 
affected [her] lawyer's performance." Cuyler, 446 U.S. at 348. Indeed, defendant 
has not pointed to a single instance where her defense counsel's performance was 
affected in any manner by the joint representation. Consequently, she has not met 
her burden of showing an actul conflict of interest or that her counsel's performance 
was adversely affected. 
Point III 
Defense counsel's performance at trial was not deficient. 
Defendant has identified no specific acts or omissions demonstrating 
deficiency and has not demonstrated prejudice, 
Defendant also argues that trial counsel was deficient in his lack of 
preparation. While trial counsel was confused about the status of the Elise's truancy 
adjudication, he was aware of the background associated with both the truancy 
matter and the misdemeanor charge, and he was prepared to undertake defendant's 
trial. Nothing in the record suggests that counsel was confused about defendant's 
case or that he was unprepared to try it. If counsel was confused and if the 
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confusion diminished his performance in any way, the harm went to Elise, not her 
mother. 
An ineffective assistance claim must show both "that counsel's performance 
was deficient" and "that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense." 
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. Accordingly, a defendant must identify "specific acts 
or omissions that fell outside the wide range of professional assistance." Maestas, 
1999 UT 32, f 20, 984 P.2d at 379 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 
Defendant here has identified none. Nor does the record demonstrate that trial 
counsel "rendered deficient performance which fell below an objective standard of 
reasonable professional judgment." Id. (internal quotation marks and citation 
omitted). 
Defendant has also failed to demonstrate prejudice. Defendant has not 
illustrated that absent trial counsel's initial confusion about Elise's case, there would 
have been a "reasonable probability of a more favorable result" in her own case. Id. 
(internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Having alleged no specific errors, 
defendant cannot argue prejudice on any other basis. 
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Point IV 
Defendant has not properly marshaled the evidence on her 
insufficiency of the evidence claim. In any event, the 
evidence sufficed to support a conviction on all elements 
of the offense, including statutorily mandated notice. 
Defendant claims that the juvenile court erred in convicting her upon 
insufficient evidence of all the elements of the crime. Specifically, defendant claims 
that the notice sent her from the school was inadequate under the statute. Defendant 
alleges that the notice was deficient because requests came from the school principal 
rather than from the school district or the school board and because requests did not 
state that refusal to respond was a class B misdemeanor. She alleges that she 
received ineffective assistance of counsel because trial counsel failed to raise this 
issue. In the alternative, defendant argues that she did respond to the school's 
requests. 
Defendant has not marshaled the evidence nor demonstrated that the trial 
court's findings are against the clear weight of the evidence. Consequently, her 
claim that counsel was inadequate for failure to argue insufficiency fails. Finally, 
her argument that she did, indeed, comply is also a challenge to sufficiency of the 
evidence. Again, the clear weight of the evidence supports the juvenile court's 
finding that defendant did not comply with the school's request for assistance. 
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A. Defendant has not properly marshaled the evidence. 
A defendant claiming insufficiency of the evidence must first marshal the 
evidence supporting the trial court's decision. State v. Gamblin, 2000 UT 44, f 17 
n.2, 1 P.3d 1108. She must then show that, viewing the evidence in a light most 
favorable to the trial court's ruling, the trial court's findings are against the clear 
weight of the evidence and therefore clearly erroneous. State v. Reed, 839 P.2d 878, 
879 (1992). "Because the trial court had the opportunity to view the[] witnesses and 
weigh their credibility, [the reviewing court] defer[s] to its findings unless the 
record demonstrates clear error." Id. at 880. 
Marshaling requires the defendant to gather all the evidence that supports the 
verdict and then explain how that evidence is not enough to sustain the conviction. 
See Gamblin, 2000 UT 44, at f 17 n.2. Defendant has not met this burden. She 
avoids mention of the number of absences, excused or unexcused. She never details 
the citations warning defendant of potential misdemeanor charges. Defendant does 
not recite testimony that two of Elise's three doctors had written letters indicating 
that Elise was able to attend school despite her illness. Defendant's statement of 
facts reduces the evidence supporting the court's judgment to a single brief 
paragraph. See Br. Aplt. at 5. Defendant's argument summarizes only a few pieces 
of evidence favorable to her. See id. at 16-21. 
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"[T]he marshaling concept does not reflect a desire to merely have pertinent 
excepts from the record readily available to a reviewing court." West Valley City v. 
Majestic Investment Ca, 818 P.2d 1311, 1315 (Utah App. 1991). Rather, 
"[c]ounsel must extricate himself or herself from the client's shoes and fully assume 
the adversary's position," by presenting "in comprehensive and fastidious order, 
every scrap of competent evidence introduced at trial which supports the very 
findings the appellant resists." Id. After gathering "this magnificent array of 
supporting evidence, the challenger must ferret out a fatal flaw in the evidence." Id. 
Given defendant's complete failure to marshal the evidence, this court should 
simply affirm her conviction. 
B. Evidence sufficed to support a conviction on all elements of the offense. 
Should this court excuse defendant's failure to marshal the evidence, it 
should nevertheless affirm because the evidence amply supports defendant's 
compulsory education violation. A careful review of the record demonstrates that 
evidence sufficed to support the trial court's determination with respect to every 
element of the compulsory educatioh offense. 
Utah law provides that the knowing "refus[al] to respond to a written request 
which is delivered to the parent pursuant to the provisions of Subsection 53A-11-
103(l)(b) by a local school board or school district" is a class B misdemeanor. 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 53A-11-101(3). Subsection 53A-1 l-103(l)(b) requires the 
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school board or district to make efforts to resolve a minor's school attendance 
problems, including, as feasible, "a written request for parental support in securing 
regular attendance by the minor delivered by certified mail, containing notice of the 
requirements of this section and stating that refusal to respond to the notice is a 
class B misdemeanor." 
Notice in this case was adequate. Despite defendant's arguments to the 
contrary, nothing in the statute suggests that the school board or district cannot 
operate through its agents and employees, including school principals, in complying 
with the statutory mandate to seek parental support in securing a minor's regular 
school attendance. The statute imposes a duty on the board or district to make 
efforts to resolve a minor's attendance problems, including, "as reasonably 
feasible," counseling, meeting with the minor and the parents, adjusting the 
curriculum and schedule where necessary to meet special needs, monitoring school 
attendance, and making the written request for parental support at issue in this case. 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 53A-11-103(1). Neither the board nor district could feasibly 
undertake these responsibilities for each truant student in each school within the 
district without working through school administrators and employees. The district 
may make the written request for parental support through the school principal just 
as it would monitor attendance and adjust curriculum and schedules through the 
principal and other school employees. Defendant cites no contrary authority. 
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Defendant claims that the letter written November 15, 1999, State's Exhibit 
6, did not meet the statutory notice requirements even though it did ask her to 
"please come in and let[]s talk about the problem." See Br. Aplt. at 19. Defendant 
apparently argues that the letter was inadequate because it did not specify potential 
misdemeanor liability. However, defendant fails to note that she received three 
excessive absence citations in addition to the letter and that two of them detailed the 
misdemeanor liability. 
The first, dated November 19 and apparently mailed with the November 15 
letter, stated: 
This citation is to notify the parent/guardian that the above student has 
three (3) unexcused absences. State law requires the parent/guardian 
to assist the school in securing regular attendance of their child and 
failure to do so can result in a class B misdemeanor charge being filed 
against the parent/guardian. 
State's Exhibit 5. The second citation, included under a cover letter dated 
November 24, also advised defendant of the potential misdemeanor charge. State's 
Exhibit 7. The third citation, together with a cover letter dated December 1, 
followed. This correspondence did not repeat the misdemeanor warning, but 
notified defendant that Elise was being referred to juvenile court and again 
requested that defendant "call for a time to come in and work out a schedule that 
will work for Elise." State's Exhibit 8. All correspondence was sent by certified 
mail. See State's Exhibit 4. 
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The first citation by itself was sufficient to meet the notice requirements of 
the law. The citation requested defendant's help. It expressly stated that state law 
required the parent to assist the school and cautioned that failure to do so could 
result in a class B misdemeanor. The following correspondence contained 
additional requests for help and an additional warning that refusal to help could 
result in misdemeanor charges. 
Notice was thus adequate. The clear weight of the evidence supports the trial 
court's conclusion that defendant refused to respond to a written request that 
included the statutorily mandated notice. Therefore, both defendant's insufficiency 
argument and her corollary argument that defense counsel was deficient for failure 
to raise the issue fail. 
Defendant argues, in the alternative, that she did comply with the request for 
her assistance. This too is a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence. When 
asked to comment on the result of his correspondence, the school principal testified 
that he knew of only two phone calls defendant made to the school. He testified 
that he returned these calls and spoke to defendant's son, identifying himself and 
stating that defendant was trying to reach him. He "spelled out a little note" when 
he returned the second call. R. 26:20. Defendant testified that she tried to contact 
the principal by phone numerous times without success. R. 26:57-58. 
The court found that defendant's testimony was not credible: 
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The evidence is clear that the written request was made and I 
believe Mr. We[]ber when he says there was no response. I do not 
believe the mother when she says that she called many times and just 
[couldn't] get through to Mr. We[]ber. I just, I don't believe that is 
credible evidence. 
On review, a trial court's findings "shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, 
and due regard shall be given to the opportunity of the trial court to judge the 
credibility of the witnesses." American Fork City v. Rothe, 2000 UT App 277 at f 4, 
405 Utah Adv. Rep. 55. 
The juvenile court did not clearly err when, faced with contradictory 
testimony, it found the principal credible and the mother not credible. The record 
demonstrates numerous inconsistencies in defendant's testimony that undermine her 
credibility. Despite her testimony of "sit[ting] up in ICU time after time" and of 
hospital stays so frequent that "the days r[a]n together in [her] mind," defendant 
conceded that certified hospital records indicated Castle View Hospital stays during 
the 1998-1999 school year of just two days in August and two in December. 
R. 26:66-68. Her only other testimony of hospitalization that school year was a 
five-day non-emergency stay at Cottonwood Hospital in the early fall-probably in 
September. R. 26:65-66, 69. She presented no hospital records for the 1999-2000 
school year. Defendant testified to her visits to at least three doctors in connection 
with Elise's illness. R. 26:52-53. On cross-examination, she conceded that one of 
them thought that Elise could attend school and another believed that Elise had "a 
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problem with school phobia or school avoidance behavior using her diabetes as a 
method of missing school on a regular basis." R. 26:69-70. Defendant testified that 
she asked that the teachers prepare homework to be sent home and that they refused. 
R. 26:59. When asked on cross-examination whether homework was ever picked 
up, defendant could only testify that she had picked up the assignments three times. 
R. 26:70. She acknowledged that the school personnel had indicated that homework 
was not being picked up. Id. When asked whether she ever returned the 
homework, defendant stated "I am not sure," suggesting that "Elise returned some 
of it when she would go back to school." Id. All of this testimony suggests that 
defendant exaggerated both the need for Elise to miss school and defendant's efforts 
to work with the school. When asked in summary what education Elise had 
received during 1999, defendant conceded, "Very little." 
The juvenile court's findings are consistent with the clear weight of all the 
evidence presented in this case. Defendant may have made some perfunctory 
contacts with the school, but she did not respond to the school's request for her 
assistance in securing her daughter^ regular attendance at school. 
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CONCLUSION 
Defendant's conviction should be affirmed. 
RESPECTFULLY submitted on December 5, 2000. 
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JA-11-101 Responsibility for minor required to attend school --Penalty for 
violation. 
(1) For purposes of this part: 
(a) "Habitual truant" is a school-age minor who has received more than two 
truancy citations within one school year from the school in which the minor 
is or should be enrolled and eight absences without a legitimate or valid 
excuse or who, in defiance of efforts on the part of school authorities to 
resolve a student's attendance problem as required under Section 53A-11-
103, refuses to regularly attend school or any scheduled period of the 
school day. 
(b) "Minor" means a person under the age of 18 years. 
(c) "Parent" includes: 
(i) a custodial parent of the minor; 
(ii) a legally appointed guardian of a minor; or 
(iii) any other person purporting to exercise any authority over the 
minor which could be exercised by persons listed under Subsections 
(1)(c)(i) and (ii) above. 
(d) "School-age minor" means a minor who has reached the age of six years 
but has not reached the age of eighteen years, but does not include a minor 
emancipated by marriage. 
(e) "Truancy citation" is an administrative notice to a truant minor 
requiring an appearance before the school truancy control officer or body 
from which the minor is truant. • 
(f) "Truant minor" is any school-age minor who is subject to the state's 
compulsory education law and who is absent from school without a legitimate 
or valid excuse. 
(2) A parent shall enroll and send a school-age minor to a public or 
regularly established private school during the school year of the district in 
/hich the minor resides. 
(3) It is a class B misdemeanor for a parent to knowingly: 
(a) fail to enroll a school-age minor in school; or 
(b) refuse to respond to a written request which is delivered to the parent 
pursuant to the provisions of Subsection 53A-11-103(1)(b) by a local school 
board or school district. 
(4) The provisions of this section do not apply to a parent of a school-age 
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or who has been declared by the local school board to be exempt from school 
endance in conformity with Section 53A-11-102. 
5) A local board of education or school district shall report violations of 
section (3) to the appropriate city, county, or district attorney. 
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UTAH CODE, 1953 
TITLE 53A. STATE SYSTEM OF PUBLIC EDUCATION 
CHAPTER 11. STUDENTS IN PUBLIC SCHOOLS 
PART 1. COMPULSORY EDUCATION REQUIREMENTS 
Copyright ® 1953-2000 by Matthew Bender & Company, Inc. one of the LEXIS 
Publishing companies. All rights reserved. 
Current through End of 2000 General Session 
3A-11-103 Duties of boards of education in resolving child's attendance 
problems --Parental involvement --Issuance of truancy citations --Procedure 
for contesting citations --Liability not imposed. 
(1) For each school-age minor who is or should be enrolled within that school 
istrict, the local school board or school district shall make efforts to 
esolve a minor's school attendance problems. Those efforts shall include, as 
sasonably feasible: 
(a) counseling of the minor by school authorities; 
(b) a written request for parental support in securing regular attendance 
by the minor delivered by certified mail, containing notice of the 
requirements of this section and stating that refusal to respond to the 
notice is a class B misdemeanor; 
(c) at least one meeting with the minor and the parents; 
(d) any necessary adjustment to the curriculum and schedule to meet special 
needs of the minor; and 
(e) monitoring school attendance of the minor for a period not to exceed 30 
days. 
(2) In addition to the efforts listed in Subsection (1), the local school 
oard or school district may enlist the assistance of community and law 
nforcement agencies as appropriate and reasonably feasible. 
(3) In the event that the minor's school attendance problem cannot be 
esolved by the efforts of the local school board or school district, the local 
chool board or school district shall refer the school-age minor to the 
.ppropriate district or county attorney or juvenile court as a habitual truant. 
(4) Any parent of a school-age minor shall, upon written request from a local 
ichool board or school district, cooperate with school authorities in resolving 
he minor's school attendance problem. 
(5) A local school board may authorize the issuance of truancy citations by 
jchool administrators and appointed truancy specialists. Recipients of truancy 
:itations may be subjected to administrative penalties, and to a fee assessed 
.n accordance with a uniform fee schedule adopted by the State Board of 
education. 
(6) A local school board that authorizes the issuance of truancy citations 
shall establish a procedure for students to contest citations. Any minor having 
received three prior truancy citations within a single school year and for whom 
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sonable efforts to resolve the attendance problem have failed, shall be 
led a habitual truancy citation and referred by the local school board or 
:>ol district to the appropriate county or district attorney or juvenile 
rt as a habitual truant. Proceedings for habitual truancy shall be expedited 
:he court. 
7) This section shall not impose any civil liability on boards of education 
:heir employees. Proceedings initiated under this part do not obligate or 
:lude action by the Division of Child and Family Services under Section 
ia-316. 
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UTAH CODE, 1953 
TITLE 77. UTAH CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 
CHAPTER 8a. CRIMINAL OFFENSE CHARGES 
Copyright ® 1953-2000 by Matthew Bender & Company, Inc. one of the LEXIS 
Publishing companies. All rights reserved. 
Current through End of 2000 General Session 
7-8a-l Joinder of offenses and of defendants. 
(1) Two or more felonies, misdemeanors, or both, may be charged in the same 
ndictment or information if each offense is a separate count and if the 
ffenses charged are: 
(a) based on the same conduct or are otherwise connected together in their 
commission; or 
(b) alleged to have been part of a common scheme or plan. 
(2) (a) When a felony and.misdemeanor are charged together the defendant is 
afforded a preliminary hearing with respect to both the misdemeanor and 
felony offenses. 
(b) Two or more defendants may be charged in the same indictment or 
information if they are alleged to have participated in the same act or 
conduct or in the same criminal episode. 
(c) The defendants may be charged in one or more counts together or 
separately and all of the defendants need not be charged in each count. 
(d) When two or more defendants are jointly charged with any offense, they 
shall be tried jointly unless the court in its discretion on motion or 
otherwise orders separate trials consistent with the interests of justice. 
(3) (a) The court may order two or more indictments or informations or both 
to be tried together if the offenses, and the defendants, if there is more 
than one, could have been joined in a single indictment or information. 
(b) The procedure shall be the same as if the prosecution were under a 
single indictment or information. 
(4) (a) If the court finds a defendant or the prosecution is prejudiced by a 
joinder of offenses or defendants in an indictment or information or by a 
joinder for trial together, the court shall order an election of separate 
trials of separate counts, grant a severance of defendants, or provide other 
relief as justice requires. 
(b) A defendant's right to severance of offenses or defendants is waived if 
the motion is not made at least five days before trial. In ruling on a 
motion by defendant for severance, the court may order the prosecutor to 
disclose any statements made by the defendants which he intends to introduce 
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TITLE 78. JUDICIAL CODE 
PART I. Courts 
CHAPTER 3a. JUVENILE COURTS 
PART 1. GENERAL PROVISIONS 
Copyright (c) 1953-2000 by Matthew Bender & Company, Inc. one of the LEXIS 
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Current through End of 2000 General Session 
78-3a-115 Hearings --Public excluded, exceptions --Victims admitted --
Minor's cases heard separately from adult cases --Minor or parents or 
custodian heard separately --Continuance of hearing --Consolidation of 
proceedings involving more than one minor. 
(1) Hearings in minor's cases shall be held before the court without a jury 
and may be conducted in an informal manner. 
(a) In abuse, neglect, and dependency cases the court shall exclude all 
persons who do not have a direct interest in the proceedings. 
(b) In delinquency cases the court shall admit all persons who have a 
direct interest in the case and may admit persons requested by the parent oi 
legal guardian to be present. The court shall exclude all other persons 
except as provided in Subsection (1)(c). 
(c) In delinquency cases in which the minor charged is 14 years of age or 
older, the court shall admit any person unless the hearing is closed by the 
court upon findings on the record for good cause if: 
(i) the minor has been charged with an offense which would be a felony i: 
committed by an adult; or 
(ii) the minor is charged with an offense that would be a class A or B 
misdemeanor if committed by an adult, and the minor has been previously 
charged with an offense which would be a misdemeanor or felony if 
committed by an adult. 
(d) The victim of any act charged in a petition or information involving a: 
offense committed by a minor which if committed by an adult would be a 
felony or a class A or class B misdemeanor shall, upon request, be afforded 
all rights afforded victims in Title 77, Chapter 36, Cohabitant Abuse 
Procedures Act, Title 77, Chapter 37, Victims' Rights, and Title 77, Chapte 
38, Rights of Crime Victims Act. The notice provisions in Section 77-38-3 
do not apply to important juvenile justice hearings as defined in Section 
77-38-2. 
(e) A .victim, upon request to appropriate juvenile court personnel, shall 
have the right to inspect and duplicate juvenile court legal records that 
have not been expunged concerning: 
(i) the scheduling of any court hearings on the petition; 
(ii) any findings made by the court; and 
(iii) any sentence or decree imposed by the court. 
(2) Minor's cases shall be heard separately from adult cases. The minor or 
his parents or custodian may be heard separately when considered necessary by 
the court. The hearing may be continued from time to time to a date specified 
Copr. (C) West 2000 No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Work 
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court order. 
(3) When more than one minor is involved in a home situation which may be 
und to constitute neglect or dependency, or when more than one minor is 
leged to be involved in the same law violation, the proceedings may be 
nsolidated, except that separate hearings may be held with respect to 
sposition. 
story: C. 1953, 78-3a-511, enacted by L. 1996, ch. 1, s 58; 1997, ch. 103, s 
renumbered by L. 1997, ch. 365, s 29; 1998, ch. 171, s 8; 1998, ch. 237, s 
< General Materials (GM) - References, Annotations, or Tables > 
NOTES, REFERENCES, AND ANNOTATIONS 
\mendment Notes. --The 1997 amendment by ch. 103, effective May 5, 1997, 
ied "or a misdemeanor as provided in Section 77-38-5" in Subsection (2). 
The 1997 amendment by ch. 365, effective March 21, 1997, renumbered this 
:tion, which formerly appeared as s 78-3a-511, and substituted "shall" for 
iy" in the second sentence in Subsection (1)(a). 
Che 1998 amendment by ch. 171, effective May 4, 1998, inserted "or a class A 
class B misdemeanor" in the first sentence of Subsection (1)(b) (Subsection 
(d) of the reconciled version), and deleted "or a misdemeanor as provided 
Section 77-38-5" in former Subsection (2). 
?he 1998 amendment by ch. 237, effective May 4, 1998, rewrote the former 
:ond sentence of Subsection (1) (a) as Subsections (1) (a) to (c) , 
lesignating the former first sentence of Subsection (1)(a) as Subsection (1) 
I former Subsections (1)(b) and (c) as Subsections (1)(d) and (e); deleted 
*mer Subsection (2), incorporating the subject matter into Subsection (1)(c) 
I redesignating former Subsections (3) and (4) as (2) and (3). 
'his section is set out as reconciled by the Office of Legislative Research 
I General Counsel. 
Iffective Dates. --Laws 1996, ch. 1, s 94 makes the act effective on January 
1996. 





cretion of court. 
dence. 
sence of juvenile. 
sence of witnesses. 
all hearing. 
sd. 
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Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 12 
Pagel 
WEST'S UTAH RULES OF COURT 
UTAH RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 
Copr. ® West Group 2000. All rights reserved. 
Current with amendments received through 10-1-2000. 
RULE 12. MOTIONS 
(a) An application to the court for an order shall be by motion. A motion 
other than one made during a trial or hearing shall be in writing unless the 
court otherwise permits. It shall state with particularity the grounds upon 
which it is made and shall set forth the relief sought. It may be supported by 
affidavit or by evidence. 
(b) Any defense, objection or request, including request for rulings on the 
admissibility of evidence, which is capable of determination without the trial 
of the general issue may be raised prior to trial by written motion. The 
following shall be raised at least five days prior to the trial: 
(1) defenses and objections based on defects in the indictment or information 
other than that it fails to show jurisdiction in the court or to charge an 
offense, which objection shall be noticed by the court at any time during the 
pendency of the proceeding; 
(2) motions to suppress evidence; 
(3) requests for discovery where allowed; 
(4) requests for severance of charges or defendants; or 
(5) motions to dismiss on the ground of double jeopardy. 
(c) A motion made before trial shall be determined before trial unless the 
court for good cause orders that the ruling be deferred for later 
determination. Where factual issues are involved in determining a motion, the 
court shall state its findings on the record. 
(d) Failure of the defendant to timely raise defenses or objections or to 
make requests which must be made prior to trial or at the time set by the court 
shall constitute waiver thereof, but the court for cause shown may grant relief 
from such waiver. 
(e) Except in justices' courts, a verbatim record shall be made of all 
proceedings at the hearing on motions, including such findings of fact and 
conclusions of law as are made orally. 
(f) If the court grants a motion based on a defect in the institution of the 
prosecution or in the indictment or information, it may also order that bail be 
continued for a reasonable and specified time pending the filing of a new 
indictment or information. Nothing in this rule shall be deemed to affect 
provisions of law relating to a statute of limitations. 
[Amended effective April 1, 1998.] 
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ADDENDUM B 
SchoolNet Management System - san Karaex ur. 
Friday, May 28, 1999 
Student Attendance Summary 
For THOMPSON, ELISE (5986230) 
Term T1: 08/26/98 To 10/30/98 
n i g n 
^>W*'5 <^A0>ih x . 
Lass Description Teacher 
Tot Tot 08/26 08/31 09/07 09/14 09/21 09/28 10/05 10/12 10/19 10/26 YTD YTD YTD 








BEG FIT 7G 




















































































































Total 175 175 0 45 
Student Attendance Summary 
For THOMPSON, ELISE (5986230) 
Term T2:11/02/98 To 01/15/99 
Class Description Teacher 
Tot Tot 11/02 11/09 11/16 11/23 11/30 12/07 12/14 12/21 12/28 01/04 01/11 YTD YTD YTD 








BEG FIT 1G 


















































PX. . . 
PX. . . 
PX. . . 
PX. . . 
PX. . . 
PX. . . 
PX. . . 
PXXXX XXXXX XXX 
PXXXX XXXXX XXX 
PXXXX XXXXX XXX 
PXXXX XXXXX XXX 
PXXXX XXXXX XXX 
PXXXX XXXXX XXX 







































Total 267 442 0 90 
SchoolNet Management System - San Rafael Jr. High 
Friday, May 28, 1999 
Student Attendance Summary 
For THOMPSON, ELISE (5986230) 
Term T3: 01/18/99 To 03/19/99 
Tot Tot 01/18 01/25 02/01 02/08 02/15 02/22 03/01 03/08 03/15 YTD YTD YTD 
21 ass Description Teacher Abs Tdy MTWRF MTWRF MTWRF MTWRF MTWRF MTWRF MTWRF MTWRF MTWRF Aba Tdy Enr 
4060 READING DURRANT, C. 35 0 XXXXX XXXXX XXXX. XXXX. X.XX XX.XX XXXXX ...XX .X.XX 97 0 134 
164 3 BEG BAND IW FARR, T. 41 0 XXXXX XXXXX XX.XX XXXX. XXXX XXXXX X.XXX XXXXX XXXXX 103 0 134 
6100 UT HISTORY DURRANT, C. 18 0 XXXXX XXXXX XX... X. .X. XXXX 79 0 134 
3200 7TH SCIENCE JOHNSON, G. 35 0 XXXXX XXXX. XXX.X XX.X. .XX. .XXXX X.XX. XXXXX XXXXX 97 0 134 
1100 VA FOUND I DOOLEY, D. 24 0 XXXXX XXX.. XXX.. XXXX. ..X. ...XX .X..X .X.XX ..X.. 88 0 134 
4071 ENGLISH I FROST, R. 10 0 XXXXX XXX.. ..X X 74 0 134 
5071 MATH 7 JOHNSON, G. 38 0 XXXXX XXX.. XXXX. XXXX. .XXX XXXXX XXXX. XXXXX XXXXX 105 0 134 
0 o 0 0 0 
Total 201 0 643 0 134 
rtDate: 12/15/1099 
TtTimc: 15 45 24 
Attendance Student History - San Rafael Jr. High a g e 
' / ^ 
r ^ 
JV 
1 Student Name M/F Birthdate Age 
Thompson, EliseD [1528] F 12/21/1985 13 
Track/School/Year Advisor Entry Exit 
A 4081999/00 <Unassigned>, 08/25/1999 
I Term/Track : Term 1 [08/25/1999-10/29/1999] - A 408 99/00 




8 Currently active students 
Tardy 
0 
C o u r s e / S e c t i o n 
8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 
23 24 25 26 27 28 2 9 30 31 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 1 0 1 0 10 


















E E E 
E E E 
E E E 
E E E 
E E E 





























Non S c h o o l Day 
H a l f Day 
Doctor's Excuse 
























Half Day Afternoon 
Tardy 
Absent 
ATTSTHST - Version 3.0.20 
1 Student Name M/F Birthdate Age 
Thompson, EliseD [1528] F 12/21/1985 13 
I Track/School/Year Advisor Entry Exit 
A 408 1999/00 <Unassigned>, 08/25/1999 
I Term/Track : Term 1 [08/25/1999-10/29/1999] - A 408 99/00 
Term Totals based on Apportion Flag 
Excused Unexcused 
151 42 
Grade Group I 




10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 






















* * * * 
* # * * 
* « * * 
* * * * 
* * * * 
* * * * 





























































































esent (.) = 122 
excused (U) = 42 
Excused (E) 144 Phone Report (P) 
Non School Day 
Half Day 
Doctor's Excuse 




























1 Student Name M/F Birthdate Age 
Thompson, EliseD [1528] F 12/21/1985 14 
I Track/School/Year Advisor Entry Exit 
A 408 1999/00 <Unassigned>, 08/25/1999 
I Term/Track : Term 2 [11/01/1999-01/14/2000] - A 408 99/00 
I Term Totals based on Apportion Flag 
Excused Unexcused 
27 175 
Grade Group I 









U S HISTORY 
PRE-ALGEBRA A 
11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 



















u u u ** u 
u u u ** u 
u u u u u 
u u u u u 
u u u u u 
u u u u u 
u u u u u 
u u u u u 
u u u u u 
u u u u u 
u u u u u 
u u u u u 























u u u u u 
u u u u u 
u u u u u 
u u u u u 
u u u u u 
u u u u u 
u u u u u 
u u u u u 
u u u u u 
u u u u u 
Non School Day 
Half Day 
Doctor's Excuse 











A c t i v i t y 
Excused 
Half Day Morning 









P r e s e n t 
Check In/Out 
Homebound 
Half Day A f t e r n o o n 
Tardy 
Absent 







U S HISTORY 
PRE-ALGEBRA A 
Student Name 
Thompson, Elise D [1528] 
Track/School/Year Advisor 
A 408 1999/00 <Unassigned>, 
M/F Birthdate Age Grade 




Currently active students 
TermfTrack : Term 2 [11/01/1999-01/14/2000] - A 408 99/00 




12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 













































































































b * * * * * * 4 
* * ** ** ** ** 
** ** ** ** ** 
** ** ** ** ** 
riod Totals 
at Scheduled (--) * 
lexcused (U) • 175 
89 Present (.) 24 Excused (S) • 27 
Non School Day 
Half Day 
Doctor's Excuse 

























Half Day Afternoon 
Tardy 
Absent 
ATTSTHST - Version 3 0.20 
8 
0 
Emery County School District sw«,su* 
First Excessive Absence Citation 
(First, second, and third unexcused absences) 
Student's Name: /Fji*>^ ~Th{M&<;*»1 Grade:, 
School: S^tf 
/tft&f/ <Jr- PtjA Date: J///fff 
Date of First Unexcused Absence: /f //^f/^y 
£8 All Day 
Q Partial Day - Classes: 
Q Individual Class: Teacher: 
Date of Second Unexcused Absence: / / 7 / y / / f 
J3 All Day 
Q Partial Day - Classes: Q Individual Class: Teacher^ 
Date of Third Unexcused Absence. //// //^f 
$ All Day 
Q Partial Day - Classes: 
Q Individual Class: Teacher: 
This citation is to notify the parent/guardian that the above student has three (3) unexcused 
absences. State law requires the parent/guardian to assist the school in securing regular 
attendance of their child and failure to do so can result in a class B misdemeanor charge being 
filed against the parent/guardian. 
District policy requires that one or both parents/guardians attend a meeting with the school 
principal/assistant principal to discuss their students attendance problem before the student is 
allowed to return to school. Please contact the school as soon as possible to schedule a date and 
Signature 
/2?/< Q?4t*A 
SENDER: COMPLETE THIS SECTION 
• Complete items 1, 2, and 3 Also complete 
item 4 if Restncted Delivery is desired 
• Pnnt your name and address on the reverse 
so that we can return the card to you 
• Attach this card to the back of the mailpiece, 
or on the front if space permits 
COMPLETE THIS SECTION ON DELIVERY 
1 Article Addressed to 
tot Wl 
A Received by (Please Pnnt Clearly) 
C Signature 
B Date of Delivery 
//- * 3-fo 
D Is delivery addces^c-ifferent froVrjytem 1 ? U 
a Agent 
Addressee 
» l s-d f 
If YES enter delivery address below 
Yes 
Q No 
3 Service Type 
^Certified Mail Q Express Mail 
D Registered • Return Receipt for Merchandise 
Q Insured Mail D C O O 
4 Restncted Delivery'' (Extra Fee) Q Yes 
2 Article Number (Copy from service label) l^o ooi- ^5"^ 
PS Form 3 8 1 1 , July 1999 Domestic Return Receipt 102595 99-M 1789 
Z 3 2 0 0 0 2 US2 
US Postal Service 
Receipt for Certified Mail 
No Insurance Coverage Provided 
Do not use for International Mail (See reverse) 
1
 Sent to 
Street & Number 






Speoal Delivery Fee 
Restncted Dekvery Fee 
Return Receipt Showing to 
Whom & Pate Oehvered 
$ 63 
I HO 
Return Reeapt Showmg to Whom 
Qate& Addressees Address 
TOTAL Postage* fees 
Postmark or Oate N 
^ y 
ii2£ 
/ ^ \ v 
San Rafael Junior High N«W fcu,i-j. 
Merlin Weber, Principal Phone (435) 384-2335 
Fax (435) 384-3354 
P.O. Box 790 
Ferron, Utah 84523 
November 15,1999 
Dear Mr. and Mrs. Thompson 
I'm concerned that Elise is still not attending school, and that you don't call to excuse her 
anymore. On the days that you don't call to excuse her, if we can't contact you by phone, she 
has an unexcused absence. Because of new school attendance laws, it becomes necessary for us 
to issue a truancy citation when students have unexcused absences. Because of so many 
unexcused absences, she's at the point that she should be referred to court for that problem alone. 
I would like to workout an arrangement and get Elise in school. You have a responsibility to get 
her to school and I have a responsibility to report when she doesn't attend. I believe that there 
must be some way to solve the problem. As I've told you before, we've had students with 
serious diabetic problems that we've been able to accommodate with the help and direction of 
the parents. Since you live so close, you'd be able to get here quickly when she has problems we 
can't handle. Elise has missed so much school that it's going to be difficult for her to return 
now, but we'll do everything we can to help her. Please come in and lets talk about how to 
solve the problem. 
Sincerely 
Merlin Weber 
,02 ^ d 
Certified Mail 
I SECTION 
^. Also complete 
(is desired. 
is on the reverse 
. . von return the card to you. 
"• Attach this card to the back of the mailpiece, 
or on the front if space permits. 
1. Article Addressed to: 
COMPLETE THIS SEC770A/ ON DELIVERY 
A. Received by (Please Print Clearly) 
C. Signature 
8. Date of Delivery 
0. Is delivery 
O Agent 
Addressee 
is delivery addre^differjBnt Trowwem 17 u res 
If YES, enter delivery address below: O No 
3. Service Type 
^Certified Mail 
Q Registered 
O Insured Mail 
D Express Mail 
• Return Receipt for Merchandise 
Q C.0.0. 
4. Restricted Delivery? (Extra Fee) Q Yes 
2. Article Number (Copy from service label) 
'%2-GT 60^ ¥^2 
PS Form 3 8 1 1 .July 1999 Domestic Return Receipt 102595-99-M-1789 
San Rafael Junior High 
Merlin Weber, Principal 
P.O. Box 790 
Ferron, Utah 84523 
November 24,1999 
Dear Valery 
I've talked with the teachers about the homework, and they will get an assignment for Monday, 
but then they want you to return it to them for correction before they prepare more. That would 
mean that you'd have to come by school each afternoon to either pick up homework or drop it 
off. I hope this will help. 
Please remember that if you don't call in to excuse Elise, her attendance records show an 
unexcused absence. Also, we were supposed to have doctor's notes for each absence. 
Sincerely 
Phone(435)384-2335 
Fax (435) 384-3354 
Merlin Weber 
Emery County School District 
Second Excessive Absence Citation 
(Fourth, fifth, and sixth unexcused absences) 
Student's Name: &(\A ? ~JJl./f$fp ^C7/l Grade:_ 
School: ^^j/j/l Kj/ztl/ Date: /I 
Date of Fourth Unexcused Absence: 
^ L All Day 
Q Partial Day - Classes: 
Q Individual Class: Teacher:_ 
Date of Fifth Unexcused Absence: //' /,p ^/& & 
j& All Day 
Q Partial Day - Classes: 
• Individual Class: Teacher^ 
Date of Sixth Unexcused Absence: / 
$C All Day 
Q Partial Day - Classes: 
'//tf/ff 
Q Individual Class: Teacher: 
This citation is to notify the parent/guardian that the above student now has six (6) unexcused 
absences. State law requires the parent/guardian to assist the school in securing regular 
attendance of their child and failure to do so can result in a class B misdemeanor charge being 
filed against the parent/guardian. 
& ~^7SA€44/Z& TiUe: 
COMMENT(S): {JzHJ, sT*^'Zfe'^^^stJ'^JZSy/^L 
S E N D E R : COMPLETE THIS SECTION COMPLETE THIS SECTION ON DELIVERY 
Complete items 1, 2, and 3. Also complete 
item 4 if Restricted Delivery is desired. 
Pnnt your name and address on the reverse 
so that we can return the card to you. 
Attach this card to the back of the maiipiece, 
or on the front if space permits. 
1. Article Addressed to: 
A. Received by (Please Pnnt Clearly) B. Date of Delivery 
C. Signature 
xUbW 
0 Is delivery address diffi 
If YES, ente/ deli 
D Agent 
^i i^l (VQA d d r e s s e e 
i t from^§n1? D Yes 
Idress below: • No 
3. Service Type 
D Certified Mail 
• Registered 
D Insured Mail 
G Express Mail 
D Return Receipt for Merchandise 
D C.O.D. 
4. Restncted Delivery7 (Extra Fee) D Yes 
2. Article Number (Copy from service label) 32^/ o*-^ i/$j 
PS Form 3 8 1 1 , July 1999 Domestic Return Receipt IO2595-99-M-I789 
San Rafael Junior High svu* &u»t- « 
Merlin Weber, Principal Phone (435) 384-2335 
Fax (435)384-3354 
P.O. Box 790 
Ferron, Utah 84523 
December 1,1999 
Dear Valerie 
Julie said that when you came yesterday you talked about changing Elise's schedule. We can do 
that, but we need to sit down and work out the details. I know that we talked about this already a 
long time ago, but it was my understanding that we would decide this together with the help of 
the counselor and the teachers involved. That's the way it needs to happen. I know that 
everyone here will do anything to help get Elise back in school. Please call for a time to come in 
and work out a schedule that will work for Elise. 
Elise has three more unexcused absences also. That makes it necessary to issue another truancy 
citation. Please call the school when you're keeping Elise home. You also need to get doctors 
notes for the days you keep her home. 
Sincerely 
Merlin Weber 
Emery County School District 
Third Excessive Absence Citation 
(Seventh and eighth unexcused absences) 
Student's Name: ^//^^f^ Grade: fT 
School: -&&AA /^j/&</ Date: j Q x ^ . . / 9*f 
Date of Seventh Unexcused "Absence: //{h\}*. ply 
All Day 
Partial Day - Classes: 
• Individual Class: Teacher: 
Date of Eighth Unexcused Absence: j / ^ / > ^ % f / / 
Ijaf All Day 
• Partial Day - Classes: 
• Individual Class: Teacher: 
This citation is to notify the parent/guardian that the above student now has eight (8) unexcused 
absences and in accordance with Utah State Code 53 A-11-103, the above named student is being 
referred to juvenile court. 
COMMENT(S): 
S E N D E R : COMPLETE THIS SECTION COMPLETE THIS SECTION ON DELIVERY 
Complete items 1, 2, and 3. Also complete 
item 4 if Restricted Delivery is desired. 
Print your name and address on the reverse 
so that we can return the card to you. 
Attach this card to the back of the maiipiece, 
or on the front if space permits. 
1. Article Addressed to: 
A. Received by (Please Print Clearly) B. Date of Delivery 
C. Signature 
D. Is delivery 
If YES, ent< 
3JL 
D Agent 
j ^ f y v - D Addressee 
a Yes 
D No 
3. Service Type 
{^Certified Mail D Express Mail 
G Registered D Return Receipt for Merchandise 
D Insured Mart D C.O.D. 
4. Restricted Delivery? (Extra Fee) D Yes 
2. Article Number (Copy from service label) 1>l4 ooi- *tby. 
PS Form 3 8 1 1 , July 1999 Domestic Return Receipt 102595-99-M-1789 


















Edward R Clark, 
Supervisor of 
Applied Technology 














Buildings and Grounds 
130 North Main • Box 120 • Huntington, Utah S452S 
(435) 687-9846 Fax (435) 687-9849 
Date: December 11/ 1998 
Dear Parent(s) 
Elise Thompson's attendance problem has not been resolved. 
The school has made an earnest and persistent effort to have your child in reauired 
attendance. Utah State law clearly requires all children to attend school and also 
requires parents and school personnel to work with the courts if problems surface which' 
cannot be resolved. 
Since we were unable to resolve the attendance problem at the school or district level, we 
had no alternative but to refer you to the Mediation Council which includes 
representation from the Division of Child and Family Services, Emery County School 
District, Local Interagency Council, and the Juvenile Court. 
Your mediation appointment is set for: 
Date: December 16/ 1998 Time 1Q:45 (there may h=> a short 
wait.) 
Location: 45 gf IQQ St / Castlft Dale, TTf.. (Fnnr Pmirnprs'Mental Health) 












ool District not to discriminate on the basis of race, color, national 
Usability in programs, activities, and employment. 
//9/97 -////<?7 uptm^ 
fi/97 &C 
3///<?7- J/&//?'? L^pa^u^ 
V&/I7 t& 
//(J/9r t£ 
'//{far ^ f 
>l$./?r ~t<C 
^ ^ k GchLh 10 
I. hereby certify ttat ififc 
w a true and exact copy of the 
/ / ' • / 
7Mr- tt/l/??'^i^1*^ 
I, hereby cenny ,te; ifcls 
is a true and exact copy of the 
medteU record of Casfariaw HoipttUL 
0 //g/eft J 
ADDENDUM C 
ELISE.WPD March 1,2000 RickTatton 
1 | APPEARANCES 
2 
3 | For the State: Mr. Brent Langston 
Assistant Emery County Attorney 
4 | P.O. Box 249 
Castle Dale, UT 84513 
5 
6 I For the Defendant: Mr. Keith H. Chiara 
Attorney at Law 
7 | 98N.400E. 





















THE COURT: I show that we have two trials back to back here. Which 
one do you want to do first? 
MR- LANGSTON: I was going to ask Your Honor how the court wants to 
proceed? It is the same witnesses and we can a ally proceed with both of them 
together or we can do it separate. However the court desires to do it. 
THE COURT: Well, there is no sense hearing from them twice, but. 
MR. LANGSTON: That is my feeling. 
MR. CHIARA: Are we trying Elise's truancy? Is that what is going on? 
THE COURT: Yes. 
MR. LANGSTON: Yes. Right 
THE COURT: Do you have any objections taking all the testimony at once 
and then we can separate at argument? 
MR. CHIARA: That is okay. I have been informed by the prosecutor 
though that the court had already determined that Elise was truant That all earnest 
ELISE.WPD March I, 2000 RickTatton P a g e 3 
1 and persistent efforts had been made. I had just assumed that decision had already 
2 been made in a previous hearing. 
3 THE COURT: No, what happened is Elise had a truancy last year and 
4 there was a diversion and it was determined that she had not complied with the terms 
5 of the diversion but I believe that a new petition was filed or we still back on the old 
6 deal? 
7 MR. LANGSTON: The way I understand it is then we reinstated the old 
8 petition, the old, because the court has already ruled in the December hearing that the 
9 terms of the diversion were not complied with so that was set aside and we are now 
10 back to where was originally with that petition with the truancy. The court has not 
11 made a determination whether she was in fact truant or not, just that a diversion 
12 agreement was not complied with. 
13 MR. CHIARA: Right 
14 MR. LANGSTON: So we are here, as I understand it, for trial on that 
15 original truancy and that also on the new charges that we filed against Valerie for the 
16 failure to comply with the compulsory education laws. Those are the two matters that 
17 I understand we are at trial on. 
18 THE COURT: What period of time is the truancy for? That is the critical 
19 question. 
20 MR. LANGSTON: That would be up until December 18th, I think is the 
21 way it was filed of last, of 1998. And that was filed by Miss Manley back then and 
22 that was originally diverted. Then we filed the new charges against Valerie that has to 
23 do with the period up until from this school year up until basically when the charges 
24 were filed in December. 
25 MR. CHIARA: See these are part of the reasons I was asking this court to 
ELISE.WPD March 1,2000 RickTatton P a g e 4 
1 continue this. To give me time to know just what is going on and be prepared on that. 
2 I haven't (inaudible). 
3 THE COURT: Just a minute. Let me straighten this out, because I don't 
4 think Mr. Langston's right on this. On the 6th of January we took an arraignment on 
5 a new truancy charge, incident number four. The original truancy was incident 
6 number one. And so the new truancy charge was denied, set for trial today, and that 
7 the critical date there is November 29th of '99. 
8 Incident number one, the original truancy charge is still out there. I assumed that 
9 if we took care of the new truancy that the other one would go away, but that has 
10 never been said. So we have a truancy on Elise, a new truancy, that is incident 
11 number four, even though it says on the docket that it is one. 
12 THE CLERK: (Inaudible) it was denied and the assistant county attorney 
13 (inaudible). 
14 THE COURT: Oh, alright, then Mr. Langston is right 
15 THE CLERK: It hasn't been. 
16 THE COURT: Let me back up, Mr. Chiara. The first incident number 
17 one was the first truancy that was diverted. She failed the diversion. It is now on trial 
18 today. Incident number four was the second truancy, it was denied on the 6th of 
19 January and not set for trial. It has gone to the county attorney's office for screening. 
20 So that is what we are here on, incident number one, and then the parents information. 
21 So let's... 
22 MR. CHIARA: All I have in my hands, it looks like, is number four for 
23 November 29th of 499. I would request if the court, if the prosecutor is going to 
24 prosecute on that that we be allowed to put on evidence as to whether earnest and 
25 persistent efforts were made to complied with that diversion agreement There is a 
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1 witness here that I think can testify to the court that earnest and persistent efforts were 
2 made. 
3 THE COURT: The issue about the diversion agreement is behind us. 
4 That is res judicata. 
5 MR. CHIARA: I understand except that my client that Mrs. Thompson 
6 tells me that she thought it was just a review hearing on how things were going. She 
7 wasn't aware that it was a matter where... 
8 THE COURT: She was here and she had it explained to her what it was 
9 about. We are not going to litigate things twice. The trial will be on whether or not 
10 the incident number one9 the truancy, is well taken or not. Not whether the diversion 
11 agreement was complied with. That's... 
12 MR. CHIARA: Can I have a copy of that then because I don't even have a 
13 copy of it. 
14 THE COURT: Yes, we can make one in the course of things. I am not 
15 going to slow down here where we are already an hour late. All it says is it is a 
16 typical truancy language and the critical date is December 18,1998. 
17 MR. CHIARA: 1998. 
18 MR. LANGSTON: 1998. 
19 MR. CHIARA: 498. 
20 THE COURT: And in the course of while we are getting started we will 
21 have this copied and give you a copy of it. 
22 MR. CHIARA: Excuse me, Your Honor, I have found a copy of it. 
23 THE COURT: Okay. Alright, anything, any more preliminary stuff before 
24 we get started here? 
25 MR. LANGSTON: No, we are prepared to.. 
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1 I THE COURT: Okay, go ahead Mr. Langston. 
2 MR. LANGSTON: We will first call Merlin Webber. 
3 THE COURT: Now we are handling both fact patterns. 
4 MR. LANGSTON: Yes. 
5 THE COURT: And we will differentiate between them all at closing 
6 statement. 
7 I MR. LANGSTON: Correct. 
8 
9 | MR. MERLIN Webber 
10 
11 I called as a witness by and on behalf of the Plaintiflf being first duly sworn by the 
12 I Clerk of the Court was examined and testified as follows: 
13 
14 I EXAMINATION 
15 BY MR. LANGSTON: 
16 Q. Would you please state your name and where you are employed? 
17 A. I am Merlin Webber. I am the principal at San Rafael Junior High. 
18 Q. How long have you been a principal there? 
19 A. This is my third year, 
20 Q. Are you familiar with a student named Elise Thompson? 
21 A. Yes. 
22 Q. Andwhyisthat? 
23 A. Well, I have known her, I have known the family for a long time, but she is a 
24 student at our school. 
25 Q. Okay. Calling your attention to the school year beginning in 1998, in the fall 
